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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Juan A. Jimenez appeals from the district court's orders denying his 
request for DNA testing and summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal case, the state charged Jimenez with 
aggravated battery in relation to the September 9, 2007 stabbing of Jay Voshall. 
(R., Vol. 3, pp.424-25.) The evidence at trial showed Jimenez and Ruben 
Nungary got into a physical confrontation with Mr. Voshall inside a Maverick 
convenience store. (Trial Tr., 1 p.144, L.7 - p.148, L.22, p.164, Ls.10-25, p.178, 
L.10 - p.180, L.11, p.197, L.20 - p.202, L.17, p.269, L.21 - p.270, L.13, p.442, 
L.18 - p.449, L.3.) Nungary and Mr. Voshall got into a fistfight. (Trial Tr., p.146, 
L.23 - p.147, L.9, p.199, L.10 - p.201, L.5, p.264, Ls.33-12, p.269, Ls.12-25, 
p.446, L.23 - p.447, L.12.) Then, according to witness accounts, 2 Jimenez 
shoved Mr. Voshail in the stomach area with one hand, causing Mr. Voshall to 
double-over. (Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148, L.6, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.183, L.17 -
p.184, L.13, p.201, L.8 - p.202, L.9, p.470, L.25 - p.471, L.6; see also Trial Tr., 
1 The district court took judicial notice of a number of documents from the 
underlying criminal case, including the transcript of Jimenez's criminal trial (Trial 
Tr.). (See R., Vol. 3, pp.437-38.) That transcript is included in Volume 2 of the 
clerk's record at pp.116-273. 
2 Mr. Voshall did not appear as a witness at Jimenez's trial. (See R., Vol. 2, 
pp.120-21.) 
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p.270, Ls.4-9 (witness testifying that store surveillance video showed Jimenez 
"lean in towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost with one arm like this towards him," 
"[a]lmost like he was giving him a one-arm hug.").) Jimenez and Nungary then 
exited the store. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.7-13, p.187, L.9- p.189, L.19, p.201, Ls.8-
16, p.270, Ls.1-13.) 
As soon as Jimenez and Nungary left the store, Mr. Voshall lifted up his 
shirt and told onlookers he had been "stabbed" or "shanked " (Trial Tr., p.148, 
Ls.10-16, p.180, Ls.8-11.) He was bleeding from his abdomen, and there was 
blood on the floor. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.17-19, p.155, Ls.6-9, p.181, Ls.7-9, 
p.182, Ls.8-11, p.202, Ls.12-21, p.253, L.14 - p.254, L.2.) Paramedics 
responded to the scene and transported Mr. Voshall to the hospital for treatment 
of a one- to one-and-a-half-inch, "straight edged," "slightly gaping" epigastric 
wound. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.13 - p.276, L.20, p.281, L.19 - p.282, L.1, p.283, 
L.17 - p.284, L.2.) 
In the meantime, police located Jimenez and Nungary and placed them 
under arrest. (Trial Tr., p.288, L.1 - p.291, L.23, p.294, Ls.2-7, p.302, L.20 -
p.304, L.10, p.305, L.14- p.306, L.7.) Jimenez had red stains on the tops of his 
shoes, which later tested positive for human blood. (Trial Tr., p.307, L.22 -
p.308, L.17, p.343, L.22 - p.344, L.10, p.347, L.1 - p.362, L.13, p.423, L.1 -
p.426, L.7.) Police also canvassed the route Jimenez and Nungary took after 
leaving the convenience store and found along that route a knife with red stains 
on the blade (Trial Tr., p.328, L.3 - p.329, L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24, 
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p.369, L.15 - p.376, L.22); those stains also tested positive for human blood 
(Trial Tr., p.417, L.15-p.419, L.6). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Jimenez guilty of aggravated 
battery. (R., Vol. 2, p.291.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 
years, with nine years fixed. (R., Vol. 3, pp.435-36.) Jimenez's conviction and 
sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Jimenez, Docket No. 35807, 2010 
Unpublished Opinion No. 305 (Idaho App. Jan. 8, 2010). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Jimenez filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and 
supporting materials. (R., Vol. 1, pp.4-84.) With the assistance of appointed 
counsel, he filed an amended petition and a supporting affidavit. (R., Vol. 3, 
pp.360-68.) Relevant to this appeal, the amended petition alleged trial counsel 
was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes when asked by 
client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to "object to, or attempt in any 
way to exclude, blood test evidence" (id., ,-i (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to "adequately 
show the DVDNideo evidence to client before trial" and otherwise failing to 
"prepare client for cross-examination" (id., ,m (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii)); and (4) 
failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for Simple Battery" 
(id., ,I (9)(c)(iv)). Jimenez also filed a motion and affidavit seeking DNA testing of 
the blood on Jimenez's shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt, swabs of which Jimenez 
alleged were still in the state's possession. (R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89.) 
The state answered the amended petition and also filed an objection to 
Jimenez's motion for DNA testing. (R., Vol. 3, pp.376-80, 390-91.) Following a 
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hearing, the district court denied the motion for DNA testing, concluding the 
request did not meet the specific requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b), (c). (R., Vol. 
3, pp.392-96; see also 9/19/11 Tr., pp.1-15.) The state thereafter moved to 
dismiss the amended petition in its entirety. (R., Vol. 3, pp.400-36.) Following a 
hearing, the district court granted the state's motion and entered an order of 
dismissal. (R., Vol. 3, pp.447-86; see also 12/9/11 Tr., pp.5-25.) Jimenez timely 
appealed. (R., Vol. 3, pp.488-91.) 
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ISSUES 
Jimenez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Jimenez's motion for 
DNA testing? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. 
Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Jimenez challenges the denial of his motion for DNA testing but 
represents on appeal that, after the district court denied his motion, he 
"was able to secure" the DNA testing in a different forum. (Appellant's 
brief, p.11 n.4.) Is Jimenez's claim of error moot because the DNA testing 
he requested has already been done? 
2. Has Jimenez failed to establish the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Jimenez's Challenge To The Denial Of His Motion For DNA Testing Is Moot 
In the underlying criminal case, the state presented evidence that red 
stains on the tops of Jimenez's shoes tested positive for human blood. (Trial Tr., 
p.422, L.14 - p.426, L.7.) Neither the state nor Jimenez conducted DNA testing 
on the blood stains, although the technology was available at the time. (Trial Tr., 
p.430, L.11 - p.434, L.15.) In closing argument, the prosecutor relied on the 
blood stains as circumstantial evidence of Jimenez's guilt, arguing to the jury it 
was reasonable to infer that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was the victim's. 
3 (4/16/08 Tr., p.12, L.19- p.13, L.3, p.14, L.25- p.16, L.5.) 
In an affidavit submitted in support of his post-conviction petition, Jimenez 
claimed to have told his trial attorney that "the blood on [his] shoe was there 
before the night the victim was stabbed" and did not belong to the victim. (R., 
Vol. 1, pp.13-14; see also R., Vol. 1, p.53 (notarized statement of Xavier 
Machuca representing he fought with Jimenez earlier in the day and the blood on 
Jimenez's shoes was his).) In his amended post-conviction petition and 
supporting affidavit, Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for refusing his 
requests to seek DNA testing of the blood on his shoes. (R., Vol. 3, pp.362, 
366.) He also filed a separate motion for DNA testing of both the blood on his 
shoes and the blood on the victim's shirt, contending "[t]he results of said testing 
3 The transcript of the parties' closing arguments, referred to herein as "4/16/08 
Tr.," is included in Volume 2 of the clerk's record at pp.275-303. 
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[would] produce new, noncumulative evidence that may tend to show that 
[Jimenez] is not the person who committed the offense." (R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89.) 
The district court denied Jimenez's motion for DNA testing, concluding 
that, to be entitled to such testing in a post-conviction proceeding, Jimenez was 
required to satisfy the specific requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b) and (c), 
including by showing that the testing sought was not available at the time of trial. 
(9/19/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.15, L.11; R., Vol. 3, pp.395-96.) The court also 
dismissed Jimenez's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding 
counsel's decision to not seek DNA testing was a matter of trial strategy and, 
even if counsel had obtained DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes and 
the results of that testing had excluded the victim as being the source of the 
blood, such results could not exclude Jimenez as being the perpetrator of the 
crime. (R., Vol. 3, pp.459-60, 480.) 
Jimenez argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his 
motion for DNA testing. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-13.) Specifically, he contends 
the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it concluded Jimenez 
was required to satisfy the criteria of I. C. § 19-4902, rather than treating 
Jimenez's motion as a request for discovery to support his ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-13.) Whether the district court did or 
did not apply a correct legal standard in denying Jimenez's motion for DNA 
testing is a moot issue, however, because according to Jimenez's own 
representations, he has since obtained DNA testing of both his shoes and the 
victim's shirt, albeit in a different forum. (See Appellant's brief, p.11 n.4 (noting 
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that, after the district court denied his motion, "Jimenez was able to secure 
testing of the shoes and Mr. Voshall's shirt in defending a federal criminal action 
in which this case was alleged as a predicate act").) 
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." State v. 
Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). Even if 
true, Jimenez's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion for DNA 
testing of the blood on his shoes and the victim's shirt no longer "present[s] a 
real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial 
relief," id., because Jimenez has, by his own admission, already obtained the 
only relief to which he was theoretically entitled pursuant to that motion - i.e., 
DNA testing of the blood on his shoes and the victim's shirt. Because Jimenez 
has already secured the DNA testing he requested in his motion, any opinion 
from this Court regarding the correctness of the district court's order denying 
Jimenez's motion for DNA testing "would simply create precedent for future 
cases and would have no effect on either party." Id. The issue is therefore 
moot, and this Court must decline to consider it.4 
4 For the reasons set forth in Section 11.C.1, infra, the state asserts the district 
court did not err in summarily dismissing Jimenez's claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not obtaining DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes. Even 
if this Court disagrees, Jimenez's remedy is not to have the blood that has 
already been tested (apparently by the FBI laboratory (see Appellant's brief, p.11 
n.4)) retested; it is to have the case remanded for reconsideration of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in light of the newly secured DNA 
evidence. 
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11. 
Jimenez Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Petition 
For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Jimenez challenges the summary dismissal of his amended post-
conviction petition, arguing he presented issues of material fact entitling him to 
an evidentiary hearing on several of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-21.) Jimenez's arguments fail. A review of the record 
and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that Jimenez 
failed to allege facts and present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case as to any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
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D. Jimenez Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Of His Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Claims 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing 
I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court 
must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required 
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 
112 (2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to 
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to 
dismissing the petition. l5;l (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990)). 
As is relevant to this appeal, Jimenez's amended petition alleged that trial 
counsel was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes when 
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asked by client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to "object to, or 
attempt in any way to exclude, blood test evidence" (id., ,I (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to 
"adequately show the DVDNideo evidence to client before trial" and otherwise 
failing to "prepare client for cross-examination" (id., 1-r,I (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii)); 
and (4) failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for Simple 
Battery" (id., ,I (9)(c)(iv)). To overcome summary dismissal of these claims, 
Jimenez was required to demonstrate that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed] 
as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of 
fact exist[edJ as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Jimenez's] case." Baldwin 
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a 
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice). 
To establish deficient performance, the burden was on Jimenez "to show 
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was 
competent and diligent." !,g. "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-
guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation." kl To establish prejudice, Jimenez was required to show "a 
reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." kl 
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Application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case 
supports the district court's order of summary dismissal; Jimenez failed to 
demonstrate from his pleadings and evidence that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
1. Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Not Seeking DNA Testing Of The Blood On 
Jimenez's Shoes 
Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing 
of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, despite Jimenez's requests that he do so. (R., 
Vol. 3, p.362, ,T9(b)(viii).) In support of this claim, Jimenez asserted he told his 
attorney that the blood on his shoes did not belong to the victim, but instead 
belonged to Xavier Machuca, an individual with whom Jimenez claimed to have 
been in a fight on the same day the victim in this case was stabbed. (R., Vol. 1, 
pp.13-14, 53; R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,I9.) According to Jimenez, trial counsel did not 
follow up on this information, either by interviewing Machuca or by seeking DNA 
testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes. (R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,I,I9, 10.) Jimenez, 
however, did not claim he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiencies. 
(See generally, R, Vol. 3, pp.360-68, 439-44.) 
The district court summarily dismissed Jimenez's claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, 
concluding Jimenez failed to allege facts that, if true, would establish either the 
deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his claim. (R., Vol. 3, pp.480-81.) 
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Specifically, with regard to the alleged deficiency, the court found Jimenez failed 
to allege facts to overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to 
seek DNA testing to discover the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes was 
anything other than sound trial strategy: 
It has been this Court's experience that competent defense 
counsel does not seek to improve the state's case for the 
prosecutor. Rather, defense counsel commonly spend much time 
cross-examining the state's witnesses about all of the available 
scientific testing and avenues of investigation that the state has not 
done or failed to explore; which is what Mr. Porter did in the instant 
case. DNA testing which could exclude [Jimenez as the 
perpetrator of the crime] would, of course, be a very appropriate 
matter for counsel to explore. That, however, is not the situation in 
this case. 
(R., Vol. 3, p.481 (emphasis original).) Regarding prejudice, the court "discussed 
at length that DNA testing of the blood on the shoes could not exclude [Jimenez] 
as being the perpetrator of the crime" (R., Vol. 3, p.480), explaining: 
DNA testing has proven to be [a] valuable tool in excluding a 
particular person as the perpetrator of an offense in certain 
situations. Such testing is often used in sex offense cases and 
homicide cases where there is bodily fluid or hair on the body of the 
victim or at the scene of the crime. DNA testing can, beyond any 
reasonable doubt, exclude a person as being the source of the 
bodily fluid or hair. In this case, however, [Jimenez's] argument is 
that the blood spots on his shoes belonged to Mr. Machuca with 
whom he had been in a fight earlier in the day, prior to the events 
resultihg in the crime charged in the underlying criminal case. DNA 
testing could not exclude [Jimenez] as the perpetrator of the crime 
charged. At best, such DNA testing would exclude the victim as 
being the source of the blood spots on [Jimenez's] shoes .... 
(R., Vol. 3, p.460.) Because the facts alleged by Jimenez, even if true, would not 
have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall, the 
court found Jimenez "failed to make a prima facie case that there is a reasonable 
13 
probability that the results of DNA testing would have changed the results of the 
trial." (R., Vol. 3, pp.459-60.) 
Jimenez challenges the district court's ruling, arguing trial counsel had a 
duty to investigate the blood evidence relied on by the prosecution and that his 
failure to have DNA testing conducted on the shoes "was objectively 
unreasonable" because "it allowed the State to infer that the blood - which in 
reality was irrelevant - was a key piece of the circumstantial evidence supporting 
Mr. Jimenez's guilt." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) He also contends he "was 
prejudiced by counsel's failure to request the DNA testing," asserting that, but for 
the state's ability in closing argument "to infer Mr. Voshall's blood was on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Neither of Jimenez's 
claims have merit. 
While it is well settled that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, it is equally well settled 
that, "[iJn any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must 
be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments," kl (emphasis added). "In 
assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, [the reviewing court] 
consider[s] not only the quantum of evidence known to counsel, but also whether 
the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further." 
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
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Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; State v. 
Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 307, 986 P.2d 323, 330 (1999)). Unless counsel's 
decision to forego any particular line of investigation is itself based on 
"inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation," such decision may not be second-guessed. 
Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145-46, 139 P.3d at 747-48; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690-91 ("strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable") 
Jimenez failed in his post-conviction petition and supporting materials to 
make a prima facie showing that counsel's decision to forego DNA testing of the 
blood on Jimenez's shoes was based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
the law, or any other objective shortcoming. Nor does he identify any objective 
shortcoming on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Even accepting as 
true Jimenez's assertion that he told trial counsel the blood on his shoes came 
from a fight with Mr. Machuca and not from the victim, Jimenez failed to present 
any evidence to demonstrate that it was unreasonable not to secure DNA 
testing, particularly in light of the other "known evidence" in the case. Murphy, 
143 Idaho at 146, 139 P.3d at 748 (citations omitted). 
The state's evidence showed only that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was 
human blood (Trial Tr., p.423, L.1 - p.426, L.7); the state did not conduct any 
DNA testing on the blood and, therefore, could not identify with any degree of 
certainty the person to whom the blood belonged (Trial Tr., p.432, L.11 - p.434, 
L.15). Although, in hindsight, it appears that DNA testing would have excluded 
15 
Mr. Voshall as the source of the blood on the shoes (see Appellant's brief, p.11 
n.45), it would have at best been a risky proposition for trial counsel to have 
sought DNA testing before trial without knowing for certain what the results of 
that testing would be. Such risk would not necessarily have been worth taking 
because, as explained be the trial court, even if DNA testing could exclude Mr. 
Vosha!I as the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such would not establish 
that Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall; it would only 
establish that Mr. Voshall did not bleed on Jimenez's shoes. Given the risks 
associated with the proposed DNA testing, and considering the de minimus 
exculpatory value of even a result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of the 
blood, it was not unreasonable for trial counsel to forego DNA testing and focus 
instead on exploiting the weaknesses in the state's case (see Trial Tr., p.432, 
L.16 - p.434, L.15 (eliciting from the state's criminalist on cross-examination that 
state's test showed stains on shoes and knife were human blood and that, 
although such tests were available, state did not perform any tests to determine 
whose blood was on shoes and knife); 4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1 - p.27, L.1 
(emphasizing in closing argument that state could have done DNA testing but did 
not and, as such, there was no evidence tying the blood on Jimenez's shoes to 
the victim)). See Harrington v. Richter,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct 770, 789 (2011) 
5 It is telling that Jimenez has apparently never asked for or secured DNA testing 
of the blood on the knife. (Compare R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89 (motion and affidavit 
requesting DNA testing of shoes and victim's shirt) and Appellant's brief, p.11 n.4 
(indicating Jimenez "was able to secure testing of the shoes and Mr. Voshall's 
shirt" in a separate criminal action) with (Trial Tr., p.417, L.15- p.419, L.6 (stains 
on knife tested positive for human blood).) Avoiding testing of the knife may also 
have played a role in counsel's tactical choice to not seek testing of the shoes. 
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(internal quotes omitted) ("Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude 
counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one 
technique or approach."). 
Even assuming some objective deficiency in trial counsel's failure to seek 
DNA testing, Jimenez failed to make a prima facie showing that he was 
prejudiced by that decision. As noted above, the district court found Jimenez 
was not prejudiced because, even assuming DNA testing would have excluded 
the victim as being the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such evidence 
would not have excluded Jimenez as being the perpetrator of the crime. (R., Vol. 
3, pp.459-60, 480-81.) That the prosecutor was able, in the absence of a DNA 
result to the contrary, to rely on the blood stains on Jimenez's shoes as 
circumstantial evidence of his guilt does not, as suggested by Jimenez on appeal 
(Appellant's brief, p.17), alter the correctness of the district court's ruling. 
Jimenez's trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the state's criminalist 
regarding the failure of the state to have conducted DNA testing on the shoes, 
despite the availability of such test, and elicited from her unequivocal testimony 
that, in the absence of such test, there was no way to tie the blood stains on the 
shoes to the victim. (Trial Tr., p.430, L.11 - p.434, L.15.) Counsel also 
emphasized these facts in closing argument, thereby undercutting the 
significance of the evidence and the state's reliance on it. (4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1 
- p.27, L.1.) These details of the trial go unmentioned by Jimenez on appeal, as 
does the fact that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was only one of many pieces of 
evidence the state relied on to prove Jimenez was the person who stabbed Mr. 
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Voshall. Other evidence presented and relied on included: (1) the testimony of 
witnesses who saw Jimenez "shove" Mr. Voshall in the abdomen and then, 
almost immediately thereafter, heard Mr. Voshall declare he had been stabbed 
and saw blood coming from his abdomen (see Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148, 
L.19, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.180, Ls.8-11, p.181, Ls.7-9, p.183, L.17 - p.184, L.13, 
p.201, L.8 - p.202, L.21 ); (2) a surveillance video that showed Jimenez "lean in 
towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost like he was giving him a one-arm hug" and then 
leave the store with one hand in his pocket (see Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.4-9, p.463, 
Ls.1-11); (3) the same surveillance video that showed Mr. Voshall double-over 
after Jimenez came towards him (see Trial Tr., p.470, L.8 - p.471, L.1 O); (4) 
photographs and witness accounts establishing there was blood on the floor very 
near the place Jimenez "shoved" Mr. Voshall (see Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.6-13, 
p.182, Ls.8-14, p.193, L.16 - p.196, L.2); and (5) a bloody knife recovered from 
the route Jimenez and Ruben Nungary took after leaving the store (Trial Tr., 
p.328, L.3 - p.329, L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24, p.369, L. 15 - p.376, L.22, 
p.417, L.15 - p.419, L.6). Given the strength of this evidence, and considering 
that even a DNA result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of blood on 
Jimenez's shoes would not have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who 
stabbed him, there is no reasonable possibility that DNA testing, had it been 
performed, would have changed the result of the trial. Jimenez has failed to 
establish error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
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2. Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Not Objecting To Blood Test Evidence 
Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for 
not object[ing] to or attempt[ing] in any way to exclude, blood test 
evidence even when the witness testified she was not certified for 
testing human blood, that the procedure she used was "a fairly new 
test", that the test used was similar to a home pregnancy test, and 
that the blood samples were never sent to a laboratory for further 
analysis. 
(R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I9(c)(iii) (transcript citation omitted); see also R., Vol. 3, p.367, 
,I18 (reiterating claim in affidavit).) The district court summarily dismissed this 
claim, finding Jimenez failed to present any "authority or evidence that any 
certification is required" for the testing performed in his case and also failed to 
present anything "to support a conclusion that [the criminalist who tested the 
blood] was unqualified to perform the tests . . . or that any objection to her 
testimony would have been sustained." (R., Vol. 3, pp.479-80.) 
Jimenez does not challenge the district court's stated basis for its ruling. 
Instead, he argues the trial court erred in dismissing this claim because, 
"[w]ithout the ability to tie the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes to Mr. Voshall," 
evidence that the stains on Jimenez's shoes tested positive for human blood was 
both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.) This, 
however, is not even remotely similar to the claim Jimenez alleged in his 
amended post-conviction petition. (Compare id. with R., Vol. 3, p.363, ,T9(c)(iii), 
and p. 367, ,T18.) Nor was it a claim ever argued to or decided by the district 
court. (See generally, 12/9/11 Tr. (hearing on state's motion to dismiss amended 
petition); R., Vol. 3, pp.451-84 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
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dismissing amended petition).) Because Jimenez never alleged trial counsel 
should have objected to the blood test evidence on the basis that it was 
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, that claim is not properly before this Court on 
appeal and this Court should not consider it. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 
579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 
109, 112 (1991); Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,331,971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. 
App. 1998); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454, 942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 
1997). Moreover, because Jimenez does not challenge the court's determination 
that Jimenez failed to make a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to object to the blood test evidence on the only grounds 
asserted by Jimenez in his amended petition, the district court's order summarily 
dismissing Jimenez's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be affirmed on 
this unchallenged basis. See, .sUL, State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 
P .2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where a basis for a ruling by a district court is 
unchallenged on appeal, appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis). 
3. Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claims That Trial Counsel Failed 
To Provide Him An Adequate Opportunity To View The 
Surveillance Video And Otherwise Failed To Adequately Prepare 
Him For Cross-Examination 
Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not providing him an 
adequate opportunity to view the video evidence before trial, contending counsel 
"would only show [the] video on a laptop computer which was obscured by the 
glass partition in the visiting room" and "did not let [Jimenez] review the DVD in a 
separate attorney room where [he] could have been able to see the screen 
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better." (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I9(b)(iii), p.366, ,I12.) He also alleged counsel did not 
prepare him for cross-examination, either by practicing any questioning or by 
telling him what questions to expect on cross-examination. (R., Vol. 3, p.362, 
,r9(c)(ii), p.366, ,r13.) As found by the district court, however, Jimenez did not 
support these claims with any admissible evidence to demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was either deficient or prejudicial. 
Jimenez claimed that his vision was obscured and that he should have 
been allowed to view the video in a "separate attorney room," but he failed to 
present any evidence whatsoever that he told his attorney he was having 
difficulty viewing the video or that his attorney could have secured a better 
viewing facility. (See generally, R., Vol. 3, pp.360-68, 439-44.) He also failed to 
allege with any specificity what counsel could have done to better prepare him 
for the state's cross-examination or explain how he was prejudiced by counsel's 
alleged failure to practice questioning with him. (See generally id.) As explained 
by the district court in dismissing Jimenez's claims: 
The scope of [Jimenez's] cross-examination was limited to the 
events of the evening that [Jimenez] testified to on direct. [He] was 
asked for details about the events of the evening that he had 
testified about on direct examination. He was not asked any trick 
questions nor was he pressed hard by the State on cross-
examination. [Jimenez's] answers were evasive and he testified 
that he did not know or did not remember quite a number of details 
about his activities on the evening of the crime. ([Trial Tr.,] pp.452-
73.) [Jimenez] has presented no information as to how his counsel 
could have improved his memory on such things as where they 
went in Boise, their route of travel to the Maverick store or the 
description of the house where a girl and her children joined them. 
Considering the testimony presented, the Court could reasonabl[y] 
infer that the jury could find [Jimenez] less than a credible witness. 
. . . A defendant who chooses to testify opens himself to cross-
examination within the scope of his testimony on direct 
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examination. That scope of cross-examination was not exceeded 
in this case. 
(R., Vol. 3, pp.475-76.) 
Jimenez does not challenge the court's factual findings, but argues those 
"findings in essence establish why summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's claim 
was in error." (Appellant's brief, p.19.) According to Jimenez, "[h]ad counsel met 
with [him] to discuss his testimony and prepared him for the questions the 
prosecutor might have asked," and also allowed him to "fully view" the 
surveillance video, the events of the evening "would have been fresher in his 
mind" and "his answers on cross examination would have seemed far less 
'evasive."' (Id.) As he did below, however, Jimenez has still failed to articulate 
how trial counsel was supposed to divine the questions the prosecutor ultimately 
asked or what counsel could have done to improve Jimenez's memory of the 
events of the evening in question. He has also failed to point to any evidence 
that he ever told counsel he was not able to "fully view" the surveillance video or 
that he asked counsel to show him the video in a "separate attorney room." 
Having failed to do so, Jimenez has failed to show error in the summary 
dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
4. Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Not Requesting An Instruction On The Lesser 
Included Offense Of Simple Battery 
Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for "not request[ing] a lesser-
included instruction or verdict form for Simple Battery." (R., Vol. 3, p.362, 
1[9(c)(iv); see also R., Vol. 3, p.367, ,T20 (trial counsel "did not ask the Court to 
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instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple battery").) The district 
court summarily dismissed this claim, ruling Jimenez failed to make a prima facie 
showing that counsel's decision to not request such an instruction was anything 
other than a matter of sound trial strategy. (R., Vol. 3, pp.476-78.) The court 
also ruled Jimenez failed to make a prima facie showing of prejudice because 
the jury, having found Jimenez guilty of aggravated battery, would never "have 
had occasion to consider an included offense of battery." (R., Vol. 3, p.478.) 
Contrary to Jimenez's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the 
applicable law supports the district court's rulings. 
A trial court is only required to instruct the jury with respect to a lesser 
included offense if: "(1) either party requests such an instruction; and (2) there is 
a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would support a 
finding that the defendant committed such lesser included offense but did not 
commit the greater offense." State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 346, 352, 883 P.2d 
704, 710 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing I.C. § 19-2132); State v. Croasdale, 120 Idaho 
18, 19, 813 P.2d 357, 358 (Ct. App. 1991). Trial counsel does not provide 
ineffective assistance by choosing, as a tactical matter, to not request a 
particular instruction, so long as such decision is not based on any objective 
shortcoming such as inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law. Carsner v. 
State, 132 Idaho 235, 970 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1999). 
In this case there is no question that a reasonable view of the evidence 
presented at trial would have supported the giving of a simple battery. As noted 
by the district court, Jimenez "testified that he 'shoved' the victim but denied that 
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he stabbed him." (R., p.477 (citing Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.10-25).) That trial counsel 
failed to request a simple battery instruction does not by itself demonstrate any 
deficiency in counsel's performance, however. Counsel was in the best position 
to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case and to make the 
tactical decision whether to request an instruction on the lesser included offense 
of simple battery or to not make such request with the goal of achieving an 
outright acquittal. As found by the district court, Jimenez did not even allege, 
much less present any evidence to demonstrate, that counsel's decision was 
based on any objective shortcoming such as inadequate preparation or 
ignorance of the law. (R., Vol. 3, p.478.) Having failed to do so, Jimenez failed 
to make a prima facie showing of deficient performance. 
Jimenez also failed to make a prima facie showing that he was prejudiced 
by counsel's failure to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
simple battery. Idaho law requires a trial court instructing a jury on a lesser 
included offense to also "instruct the jury that it may not consider the lesser 
included offense unless it has first considered each of the greater offenses within 
which it is included, and has concluded in its deliberations that the defendant is 
not guilty of each of such greater offense." I.C. § 19-2132(c). Because any 
included offense instruction would have been accompanied by an acquittal first 
instruction, the jury in Jimenez's case, having convicted on the charged offense, 
would never have had occasion to consider the included offense of simple 
battery. The district court thus correctly concluded that, even had a simple 
battery instruction been requested and given, there was no reasonable possibility 
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that the giving of such instruction would have altered the outcome of Jimenez's 
trial. See State v. Joy._ P.3d _, 2013 WL 3185264, **4-5 (Idaho, June 25, 
2013) (and cases cited therein) (adopting "acquittal first" rule and holding "a 
district court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses is harmless 
error in cases where the jury has convicted the defendant of the greater 
offense"). Jimenez has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of this 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders denying Jimenez's motion for DNA testing and summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 18th day of July 2013. 
Deputy Attorney Getieral 
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